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JURISDICTION
Default Judgment was entered against the Defendant on August
24, 1994. The trial court denied Defendant's Objection to Proposed
Order (Default Judgment), Motion to Stay Entry of the Default
Judgment and in the alternative Motion for Relief from Order and/or
for a New Trial on September 22, 1994.

(R. 235)

of Appeal was filed on October 12, 1994.

A timely Notice

(R. 237) This court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(d).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing

the Defendants1 Answer as sanctions for failure to comply with
discovery given Defendant's inability to comply rather than wilful
noncompliance?
2.

(R. 153 & 207).

Did the trial court err in dismissing the Defendants1

Counterclaim in view of the fact that no previous order gives any
notice of such action and no opportunity for any hearing was
afforded the Defendants prior to the court sua sponte striking
such? (R. 195 & 208.)?
3.

Were the Defendants denied due process when the trial

court failed to have the Plaintiff or itself transmit signed copies
of either the order compelling discovery or judgment to the
Defendants after entry as required by the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration? (R. 196 & 208-9)?1
4.

Did the trial court err in not requiring some type of

evidentiary hearing and allowing the Plaintiff to incorporate into

Did the Circuit Court's practice
of falling
to Issue Memorandum
Decisions (simply notifying
the parties by mailing highlighted
copies of the
court's Docket) comply with the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration?

1

its judgment "just over $11,000" of the $13,515.58 in claimed
damages of a third party who was barred from attempting further
collection and the Plaintiff in this case was technically barred
under the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion from
including such in its damage claim?

(R. 207-209)

STATUTES
The text of the Utah Code Ann. §§58-55-17, now §58-55-604, §4504 UCJA and Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. are contained in Appendix F.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Defendant James D. Craghead is the owner of a home located up
Millcreek Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah, (hereinafter "property") .
Defendant Aspen Construction Co. and F. Lynn Padan, respectively,
are the general contractor and the responsible licensee whom Mr.
Craghead contracted with to do a significant remodeling of the
property.
Michael Mower is a subcontractor who contracted with Aspen to
do the sheetrocking and related work in relationship to the
remodelling.

Mower in turn, subcontracted a portion of his

sheetrocking job to Martin Bennett.
licensed general contractors.

Aspen and Mower are duly

Bennett is not licensed.

In late 1992, both Bennett and Mower filed mechanic liens
against

the

property

claiming

$13,135.77

and

$13,515.58,

respectively. Craghead and Aspen disputed the liens and claimed an
offset for damage to the premises when Mower and/or Bennett failed
to cover certain beam work which had been previously painted and
lacquered.

The damage resulted in the beam work having to be

completely refinished at a cost of between $3,900 - $4,500.
2

B.

Course of Proceedings

Both Bennett and Mower f i l e d separate mechanics l i e n s against
the property.

Later, Bennett f i l e d s u i t in the D i s t r i c t Court t o

foreclose h i s l i e n ,

and Mower f i l e d

foreclose h i s l i e n .

Mower moved in both the Circuit and D i s t r i c t

Courts t o consolidate the two cases.

suit

in Circuit

Court

to

Before either court could

address the propriety of consolidating the two cases, the D i s t r i c t
Court granted the Defendants 1 Motion t o Dismiss the Bennett case
pursuant

to

§58-55-17

U.C.A.

and awarded attorney's

fees

of

approximately $3,000 against Bennett pursuant to §38-1-18 Utah Code
Ann. (1989) . (see Appendix A-l and A-2).
Before addressing significant dates of the procedural history
in the present case i t i s important to understand what information
the P l a i n t i f f had obtained from the two proceedings.
The attorney for the P l a i n t i f f , Ms. Falk, also represented Mr.
Mower in the D i s t r i c t Court case.

Before the D i s t r i c t

Court

granted the Motion to Dismiss in the Bennett case the Defendant
submitted s i g n i f i c a n t discovery (see Appendix B) , including taking
Mower's and Bennett's
relationship
was such that
a 1099 (not a W-2) and treated
him as an independent
employee.
Bennett therefore
sought his remedy independent
as an employee through the Industrial
Commission.

Mower issued
Bennett
contractor
- not an
of Mower rather
than

I.
Significance
of the Bennett Case Third District
Court
930904047CV.
The Bennett proceeding
(District
Court) is important
to this case
because
significant
discovery
was undertaken in the Bennett case, including
depositions
of Mower and Bennett,
of which Plaintiff's
counsel
was aware.
In order
to
analyze
whether the Defendants
were acting in good faith
(whether
the
order
striking
the Answer
and granting
a Default
Judgment
as sanctions
was
appropriate),
we would respectfully
submit that the discovery
undertaken
in both
proceedings
must be reviewed since significant
action took place in the
Bennett
case that is relevant
to the present
case.
Additionally,
of the $13,515.58
claimed by Mower, he clearly
acknowledged
that "just over $11,000.00"
is due to Bennett's
work, i.e.,
that only
$2,500.00
(approximate)
is due to him separately
as a markup or for materials.
(See Mower
deposition
in District
Court proceedings,
page 26 lines 4-6 attached
hereto
as
Appendix
C.)
3

Mr. Bennett1s and Mr. Mower's depositions.
B-5.)

(See Appendix B-4 and

This is important because the facts and circumstances

surrounding the Bennett case were exactly the same facts and
circumstances involved in the present case.

Because counsel for

the Plaintiff in the present case had in her possession significant
discovery in the Bennett case she was privy to all the information
obtained from the Bennett discovery, including the Bennett and
Mower depositions.

(This discovery is information the Circuit

Court was never aware of.)

The Appellants would respectfully

request this court to keep this in mind when it determines whether
the Plaintiff suffered any real prejudice due to the problems with
the discovery in the present case.
1.

Procedural Timeline of Present Case

With the discovery facts regarding the Bennett case in mind,
let us now turn to the timeline of the case at issue.

On January

24, 1993, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in Circuit
Court. On March 28, the Plaintiff submitted his first Request for
Documents and Interrogatories.

Among those Interrogatories were

four (4) specific questions.
Interrogatory No. 20:
Identify the names and addresses of each and every
individual or entity who supplied labor and materials or
both to the project.
The Defendants1 answer to Interrogatory No. 20 was:
Object as being overly broad and not relating to any
issue involved in this particular suit. In addition,
such information is confidential as it presents a group
of tradesmen available to the Defendant which gives him
an economic edge. Without further clarification as to
the relevance of this information these parties object as
being overly broad and burdensome. In addition Mower, if
he was on the job as much as he claims, would know much
of this information.
4

Interrogatory No. 31:
Identify all correspondence, contracts or any writing of
any kind or description between and among the contractor,
architect/engineer,
subcontractors,
material
and
equipment suppliers, the owner, field representatives,
bonding and surety companies, consultants, or any other
person, firm, or entity concerning or affecting the
project.
The Defendants1 answer to Interrogatory No. 31 was:
Object as being overly broad and not related to issues
relative to the mechanics lien foreclosure action and
related offsets and counterclaims.
If counsel for
Plaintiff can provide the basis of why such a broad
question needs to be addressed or what the scope or the
extent of the work is leading to, we would be happy to
reevaluate our answer; however, based on the foregoing
and without waiving any objection I know of no
correspondence, contracts, or writing of any kind with
any subcontractor, material and equipment suppliers,
field representatives, bonding and surety companies,
consultants, or other persons, firms, or entity affecting
the project.
There was correspondence with the
contractor and with such certain architect/engineers,
however, to the extent such would lead to any
discoverable information or are relevant in this case are
highly questionable.
Interrogatory No. 34:
Identify all documents evidencing loans taken out by you
of which any proceeds were used in connection with the
project. Appellants answer was "In relationship to Aspen
Construction and/or Lynn Padan: none."
Interrogatory No. 36:
"Identify all conversations or communications between you
and the Plaintiff in connection with the project.
The Defendants1 answer to Interrogatory No. 36 was:
It is difficult at best to identify all conversations.
If you can identify a particular topic I can attempt to
answer with some degree of certainty, but with such a
broad question it is difficult.
A

complete

list

of

Interrogatories

submitted

Plaintiff/Appellee is found in Appendix C-4 and C-5.

5

by
Many

Plaintiff's

request

•See Append i x (.

f o r documents were e q u a l l y broad and v a g u e .

I an I < ""•5.

Between March 28 and May 17 t h e D e f e n d a n t s 1 c o u n s e l was u n a b l e
clients1

to obtain his

1! nioi" rocjat: "*•'—
On Ma;
on June

cooperation

niniul Request

Plaintiff

1J

UHC t r i a l

adequately respond t o

1 oi l)i

f i l e d a Motion t o Compel D i s c o v e r y .
court

judge

entered

D i s c o v e r y a s e v i d e n c e d by t h e r e c o r d .
However,
Defendants

as

were

the
never

mailing
served

an Order

(1

certificate
a

copy

< > nt i]I i ii :te 9

of J o s e p h M. Chambers.

And

Compelling

78.)
will

1
"
"

nl

t h e r e f o r e had no n o t i c e t h a t s u c h an Order was
See A f f i d a v i t

the

:

indicate

the

"'^11 m i l i s

and

act ever issued.

(R. 7 9 . m a i l i n g

1 9 9 I i( • ::>ir

certificate

I

D e f e n d a n t s d i d answer P l a i n t i f f f s f i r s t s e t o f I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s
on June

( w i t h i n t h e timeframe o f t h e Jun

-

1 9 9 4 , Order which

%
Interrogatories

*.

remaining I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s
filed

complet

Documents.5

#

Defendants

objected.

.our

(4)

~

the

D e f e n d a n t s f e l t t h e y , i n good f a i t h , had

n s w e r s and c o m p l i e d w i t h P l a i n t i f f ""'s R e q u e s t

for

However e on J u l y 6, P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a Motion t o Compel

answers t o the four

(4) I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and d o c u m e n t s .

The Defendants'
attorney
did not submit a response to the Motion
because
the reason the discovery
was not answered was due to his clients
not taking
time
to provide responses.
Counsel felt submitting
a reply under such
circumstances
would likely
violate
Rule 11 U.R.C.P.
The responses submitted by the Defendants to the Plaintiff
Mower's Request
for Production
of Documents were similar
to Mower's response to the
Defendants
request
in the Bennett case.
Compare Appendix Qy^ and Appendix £- S
C

The language of Plaintiff%s Motion to Compel is crucial since
the language of the Motion was much narrower than the language in
the Order actually granted by the judge.
The Plaintifffs Motion requested "that his motion to compel
and for sanctions be granted and that he be awarded his fees and
costs incurred in bringing this motion."

(R. 109.)

On July 8, two (2) days later, the Plaintiff deposed Mr.
Padan.

During this deposition Plaintiff was able to sufficiently

clarify his discovery requests so that the Defendants could provide
the documents that Plaintiff desired.

Having finally understood

what the Plaintiff was requesting, Mr. Padan agreed to provide the
documents requested by July 15.

(See Appendix C-8 pages 3-6.)

The events that occurred during the Padan deposition are
crucial in judging the intent of the Defendants. During the Padan
deposition,
request.

the Plaintiff was able to clarify his discovery

During the deposition all parties were able to establish

a timetable to satisfy the discovery requests and during the
deposition, Defendants were given the impression that Plaintiff had
waived her Motion to Compel.

(R. 161 paragraph 8 Padan Affidavit.)

After the deposition, Mr. Padan went to work gathering the
requested

information from computer records at his office by

pulling requested documents from his computer hard drive and other
computer disks and compiling them onto a few computer disks that he
could then transfer to Plaintiff. However, on July 13, Mr. Padanfs
office was burglarized.

(R. 164.)

Quoting from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office initial
report, the police stated, "it has been determined that there are
approximately

three

miniature

computers,
7

two

desktop

model

computers, one
telephone,

which was

m

xm

r-ox

a a box, one

machine and other assorted office items to include

personal disks, company disks

preprogrammed disks."

The

report continued by stating:
Kevin Monson reports that he left the business at 21:00
hours on 7/13/94 and when he returned at 07:30 hours he
found someone had pried the front door to the north, made
entry into the business and removed the listed property.
It was apparent that the suspects were intent on
obtaining only computer equipment, because other items
such as air staple gun and some other power tools had
been passed by.
Monson reports that it appears that each of the disks had
been gone through, and in fact, in his office the small
disks had been thumbed through and only certain disks
removed.
Among the disks and computer files taken during the burglary
^

documents for

the Plaintiff as well

the disks containing the files

had

already compiled.
Immediatel:

Padan

Defendants1

and

Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Falk.

counsel

called

Numerous calls were made and

messages left, both with Ms. Falk

• ..:i: ig ser v :i < ::e a,,i u I, I: .hi : < : i lgh

her secretary, However, she did

eturn any of the calls to Mr.

Padan or Mr. Chambers. At this time defense counsel was suffering
from pneumonia and was unable \o practic:*'. lai » To? ,i pariod of time.
(R. ir •'> Affidavit -T

hambers.)

(This

;he reason for Mr. Padan

attempting to contact Plaintifffs counsel directly.)
Because Ms, FYJ I I
l
k a ml Mi, Chambers had in ill, in "
communicate

concerning

t h e burglary,

o n July

'-

n fiblo to
Plaintifffs

c o u n s e l filed a M o t i o n t o Submit for D e c i s i o n h e r J u l y 6 M o t i o n t o
granted Plaintiff1s

C
Motioi

i

)
o

It is not so important that the court granted the Motion; but
rather, it is the scope of the trial courts Order that is
significant.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel only asked for:

compelled discovery, sanctions, and fees.

(R. 109.)

However, in

the trial courtfs docketing statement the court mentioned for the
first time the language, "the Defendant is to respond within twenty
(20) days or the answer is stricken and judgment entered."
148.)

(R.

This language was not in the Motion to Compel nor was

Plaintiff sent a copy of the internal disposition summary included
in the court docket.
Only after August 4 did Plaintifffs counsel respond for the
first time to the numerous messages left by the Defendant and
Defendant's counsel regarding the burglary.

In the fax, counsel

refers to the Order granted by the trial court on July 27 and
states that the defense must respond fully within twenty (20) or
the judgment against them would be granted pursuant to the Order
issued by the judge on the 27th of July.

See Appendix D.

Additionally, counsel for the Plaintiff was unwilling to grant any
leeway due to the burglary or the medical problems of defense
counsel.

As the fax shows, she was simply unwilling to work with

Defendants nor was she willing to accommodate

the practical

impossibility of complying with discovery because of the burglary.
A few days later, on August 8 counsel for the defense sent a
letter to Plaintiff's counsel, including an Affidavit documenting
his medical problems.

(Appendix E)

In this letter, defense

counsel accused Plaintifffs counsel of intentionally attempting to
stay ignorant of the facts of the case, of her failure to return
the numerous messages left by both Mr. Padan and defense counsel,
9

and h e r k n o w l e d g e a n d a reminder that
depot 11 1

mi hi 1 r II thril

not u n t i l t h e Padan

tin* "nil I iciently clarified t h e scope of

her discovery that would allow t h e Defendants t o comply.
Instead of responding t o the letter f Plaintiff filed a M o t i o n
dgment <
failure

v>ased Defendant f «=

August

comply with t h e August

Order

Compel.

It

important t o b e aware that Plaintiff's Motion
w»c! s fi led oniv

if teen (15) days after t h e trial court signed t h e

Order w h i c h g a v e Defendants twenty

(20) days

comply.

The

D e f e n d a n t s feel they have complied w i t:,h dill I he
to t h e full extent of their ability
C.

do so.

Disposition in Trial Court
against t h e

D e f e n d a n t s f o r over $18,000,

(R 189.) However, t h e Defendants

w e r e only mailed a n unsigned copy of the judgment back o n August 19
I io
they never received a copy

judgment.

A p p e l l a n t s repeat

signed judgment

n o mailing

c e r t i f i c a t e b y a clerk or counsel states such

;r

e11Ir\ b) <" 1'hie court-.
On

August

Proposed Order

2 6 , t h e Defendants
(Default Judgment)

filed

an Objection

ind Request I

Slay

e
-f

Judgment a n d in the Alternative Motion for Relief from Judgment and
for a l e w T r i a l .

O n September

,.

trial court denied t h e

D e f e n d a n t s Motion

if

A p p e a l a n d this case n o w stands before this court

b e addressed.

SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT
<iiv»Mi I llhii' t ut <JI I 11 y nl lite n n j < most t i n c e s , w l i e i e l i t e D e f e n d a n t s
had answered a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of t h e d i s c o v e r y submitted and

because of a burglary were unable to produce the remainder of
certain documents, it was an abuse of discretion to strike the
Answer and a substantial Default Judgment against the Defendants.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CIRCUIT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
DEFENDANTS1 ANSWER AS SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
DISCOVERY GIVEN DEFENDANTS1 INABILITY TO COMPLY RATHER THAN
WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE.
A.

A Default Judgment Is the "Capital Punishment" of All
Sanctions and Should be Used Only as a Last Resort When
Other Less Stringent Sanctions Would be Ineffective.

Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the
numerous sanctions available to a trial court when a party fails to
cooperate with discovery.

The Rule requires the court to issue

sanctions that "are just."

It then outlines specific sanctions.

Such sanctions range from staying the proceedings until the order
is obeyed, to contempt charges. However, all would agree that the
"capital punishment" of all sanctions described in Rule 37 is the
"dismissing [of] the action or proceeding or any part thereof, [or]
rendering a default judgment." Utah. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (1994).
In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunlev. 396 P.2d 401 (Utah 1964),
the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[w]e recognize that granting of a
judgment

against

a party

solely

for disobeying

an order to

cooperate in discovery procedure is a stringent measure which
should be employed with caution and restraint and only where the

11

failure has been willful and the interest of justice so demand."
IlL

<»'• ,lLl l«""

The Tucker court went on to caution the lower court that,
11

[ E ] xcept

aggravated

cases,

serious

sanctions

app] :i eci to accomplish the desired results,
particularly

where

there

Is

any

likelihood

depriving a party of a meritorious cause of
B.

injustice

by

defen&p." id.

The Discretion of the Trial Court Must Comport with
Reason and Justice and Should Resolve Doubts in Favor of
Permitting Parties to Have Their Dav in Court on the
Merits of the Controversy.

The standard c

review for this issue is abuse

When revi e wi ng

,

given trial courts considerable latitude.
Court noted

discretion.
• have

However, as the Supreme

Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601

(1976),

(after

[T]his [discretion] does not mean that the court has
unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary manner.
Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law is the
principle that reason and justice shall prevail over the
arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person; and
that this applies to all men in every status: to courts
and judges, as well as to autocrats or bureaucrats. The
meaning of the term 'discretion1 itself imports that the
action should be taken within reason and good conscience
in the interest of protecting the rights of both parties
and serving the ends of justice.
Id. at 603.
After reviewing the reasons Defendants were unable to comply
with the twenty (20) day limit, the Appellant invites this court to
ask itself whether ordering Judgment aqaimJ. II v iMSl'endant s was:
(1) employed with caution and restraint and only where the failure
has been willful and the interests of justice so demand; (2) issued
cm h< rif i P I ilet eriii i n ni iiKi II i< iiof oiKlrinf ?,'" ,trf m n s c o n s i i t u t e d

» very

aggravated case; (3) imposed only after determining less serious
12

sanctions could not accomplish the desired results; (3) unlikely to
cause injustice or deprive the Defendants of a meritorious defense;
or, (4) imposed after determining that the Defendants1 failure to
comply within the twenty (20) day limit had been willful?
If this Court answers no to such questions, then the Appellant
submits the trial courtfs decision was not "taken with reason and
good conscience and in the interest of protecting the rights of
both parties and serving the ends of justice11

And if such is the

case, this Court should find that the trial court did abuse its
discretion.
C.

Because of the July 13th Burglary, Defendants1 Failure to
Comply was Due to Inability Rather than Willful
Noncompliance, thus Striking the Defendants1 Answer and
Counterclaim Awarding Judgment for Plaintiff was an Abuse
of Discretion.

The trial court issued Judgment for Plaintiff on August 24
solely because the Defendants supposedly failed to comply with the
twenty (20) day timeframe stated in the August 4 Order compelling
discovery. It is therefore essential to focus on the Defendants1
violation of the twenty (20) day timeframe in order to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Judgment.
The trial court's August 4 Order compelling discovery stated:
"Plaintiff's Motion to compel is granted. Defendants are
to provide their response to Plaintifffs within 20 days
or Defendants1 answer will be deemed stricken and
j udgment entered." (R. 109.)
Twenty (20) days after this Order was issued, the trial court
entered a Judgment against the Defendants.

The Judgment stated:

"the Court ordered defendants to produce the requested discovery by
no later than 20 days from the date of the Court's ruling, or
judgment will be entered in favor of the Plaintiff." (R. 148.)
13

As

the twenty

(20) days was to commence seems to have caused

some i

counsel

filed her Motion for Entry

Judgment on August 1 9 — o n l y fifteen (15) days after the trial court
signed the Order which gave Defendant twenty
^ompel.
before

signing

the

Entry

Compel,

a fill1 twenty

the trial court

t iiif I ,

The trial court waited until August 24
of

Judgment,

signing the August 4 Order to Compel.
Defendants

(20) days I

twenty

(20)

days

However l(l in, or d o

(20) days to comply with the
should have signed

after

I
Order

the Judgment

w** w,uC

morning UJ. Uie 25th of August.
Notwithstanding the problem above, the issue before this court
is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
Judgment for I tin lJ 1 w \ irit i f 1 ber/ciii:ie

supposedly failed

to comply with the Order within twenty (20) days.
Appellants submit that the Jul y 13th burglary of M~
office mad*

s

it impossible for Defendants to comply with the trial

court's Order within the twenty (20) day limit.
from the Salt Lake County Sheriff f s office

The police report

Kites:

At this time, it has been determined that there are
approximately three Miniature [sic] computers . . . . One
telephone, a Fax machine and other assorted office items,
to include personal disks, company disks, and pre
programmed disks. Estimated loss at this time is thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000).
(Police report,
see R.
164) .
The police report narrative commented that:
It was apparent that the suspects were intent on
obtaining only computer equipment, because other items
such as air staple gun and some other power tools, had
been passed by.
Monson reports that it appears that each of the
desks had been gone through, and in fact, in this office
the small disks had been thumbed through and only certain
disks removed.
(See R. 164)•
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In Arnica Mut. Ins, Co, v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah
App. 1989) This court reasoned:
Imposing [default] sanctions for a partyfs refusal to
respond to a court order compelling discovery is a harsh
sanction and therefore, requires "a showing of
•willfulness, bad faith, or fault1 on the part of the
non-complying party. "
"Willful failure" has been
defined as "'any intentional failure as distinguished
from involuntary noncompliance."
In Arnica, the Defendant asserted that the only basis for
sanctions was his failure to produce personal tax returns, and such
failure was not willful but due to inability.

In response, this

Court held: "Schettler1s position is not supported by the record.
It is clear from the trial court's order that failure to produce
personal

tax

returns was

not

the

only

reason

for

entering

Schettler1s default. Furthermore, Schettler failed to demonstrate
.

. . that his failure to produce the tax return was due to

inability."

Id. at 962.

Unlike the facts in Arnica, it is clear from the trial courtfs
order that Defendants1 failure to produce the requested discovery
within the twenty (20) day time limit was the reason the trial
court granted judgment for the Plaintiff.

(R. 164.)

Moreover, from the sheriff's report, Mr. Padan's Affidavit (R.
160), and Mr. Chambers1 Affidavit (R. 155 and 160), the Defendants
in the present case have demonstrated that their failure to comply
with discovery within the twenty (20) days was due to inability.

(Citing
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
684 P.2d at 1266 (quoting
Internationale
v. Rogers. 357 U.S. 197, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255
8

(10th

Clr.

(Citing M.E.N. Co. v. Control
1987)).

Fluldlcs,

15

Inc..

834, F. 2d 869,

Soclete
(1958))).
872-73

Mr. Padanfs Affidavit established that "documentation which
[he] had spent several hours pulling together, was taken along with
all [his] office equipment.11

(See R. 161). The S.L.C. sheriff's

report establishes there was in fact a burglary of Mr. Padan1s
office and that many computers and computer files were stolen.

(R.

164.)
Immediately after the burglary, Mr. Padan states "[he had]
attempted to contact Attorney FaIk with respect to these matters
but [had] not made contact at this time, having left messages and
her in turn attempting to return calls to me [him]." (R. 161.)
Pursuant to the trial courtfs August 4 Order, the Defendants
had through August 24 to comply with discovery.

Eleven (11) days

prior to that deadline, a burglary of Mr. Padan1 s office made it
impossible to comply with the court's twenty (20) day limit.
Defendants, in good faith, attempted to contact Plaintifffs
counsel and inform her of the burglary and discuss alternatives.
Without possession of the necessary documentation, Defendants1
failure to comply was involuntary rather than willful or an
intentional failure to comply.

Given this court's language in

Arnica, the trial court abused its discretion when it entered
Judgment against Defendants.
To put the level of noncompliance in perspective, Defendants
had already responded to thirty-five (35) of the thirty-nine (39)
Interrogatories and had provided many documents.

The Defendant

Padan, the contract, or had been deposed and had stipulated to have
his deposition continued to another date. This is not a case where
the

Defendants

were

not

cooperating—there
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was

significant

compliance.

The whole issue of noncompliance is over four (4)

broad Interrogatories and some stolen documents.
When speaking on the abuse of discretion standard as it
relates to upholding or reversing sanctions imposed by the trial
court, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

H

it has always been the

policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties
to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Carman
v. Slavens,

546 P.2d 601,603 (Utah 1976).

The merits of the Defendants1 case are especially compelling.
Of

the

$13,515.58

sought

for

in Plaintiff's

Complaint,

the

Plaintiff himself admits that "just over 11,000.00" is attributable
to a claim the District Court dismissed in a sister proceeding to
this action. (Mower deposition in District Court proceeding, page
26 lines 4-6). Additionally,

Defendants can document a $3,900 -

4,500 offset due to damage Plaintiff caused to varnished beam work
giving rise to his $13,515.58 claim against Defendants.
To deny Defendants the opportunity to present their case
solely because a burglary made it impossible for Defendants to
respond to four (4) Interrogatories and produce documents within
the twenty (20) day time limit, is not within the spirit or intent
of Rule 30.
The Supreme Court has addressed similar issues and resolved
the problem by giving the parties a day in court.

In Carman. the

Defendant did not appear at a scheduled deposition and failed to
produce the requested documents.

The trial court ordered the

Defendants1 answer stricken and his default entered because "there
did

not

appear

in

the

record

any

justification

for

[the

Defendants1] failure to appear at the deposition and produce the
17

documents" Id. at 602. However, the Supreme Court held that under
the circumstances

shown, the striking

of defendant's .

pleadings and entering judgment against [defendant] was an abuse of
discretion; and the interest of justice will be best served by
vacating that order and remanding the case for trial.11 Id. at 603.
Appellants respectfully submit the circumstance in the present
case compels this Court to allow the Defendants their day in court.
THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DEFENDANTS1
COUNTERCLAIM IN VIEW OF THE FACTS THAT NO PREVIOUS ORDER GIVES
ANY DEFENDANT NOTICE OF SUCH AUTHORITY AND NO OPPORTUNITY FOR
ANY HEARING WAS AFFORDED THE DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO THE COURT SUA
SPONTE STRIKING THEIR ANSWER.

II.

This appeal

involves two Orders, neither

of which gave

Defendants notice that the court would strike their Answer or that
their Counterclaim would be dismissed.

Plaintiff first submitted

an Order compelling discovery May 17, 1994. On June 9, 1994, the
trial court granted that Order. However, Plaintiff failed to mail
a copy of the signed Order to Defendants1 counsel. The Certificate
of Service on the signed Order states that a true and correct copy
of the above Order was mailed to the Defendants1 counsel on May,
17, 1994—23 days before the judge signed and issued the Order.
Defendants were never given notice of this Order when it was
signed,

and

were

therefore

accordance with it.

unable

to

govern

themselves

in

Nevertheless, Defendants did respond to

Plaintiff's discovery requests in good faith and gave what they
felt were complete answers given the vagueness of Plaintiff's
request.
Apparently, Plaintiff was unhappy with certain answers and
filed

a

second

Motion

to

Compel

answers

to

the

four

(4)

Interrogatories and for sanctions on July 6, 1994, (See Appendix C18

6 and C-7, R. 109) .9 This is the Motion that lead to the trial
court's order granting Judgment for Plaintiff. In this Motion, the
Plaintiff only requested "that this Motion to Compel and for
Sanctions be granted and he [Plaintiff] be awarded his fees and
costs

incurred

in

bringing

the Motion."

(See R.

109-10.)

Plaintiff's supporting Memorandum requests only that the Court:
[E]nter an order requiring defendants to respond to
plaintiff's discovery requests, to produce the documents
forthwith, to award plaintiff reasonable costs and
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in bringing this
Motion to Compel dated May 17, 1994, and for Sanctions."
R. 114.
Plaintiff made no suggestion that the court strike Defendants'
answer and grant Judgment for Plaintiff.
Two days after Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel, the
Plaintiff deposed Mr. Padan.

At this deposition, counsel for

Plaintiff clarified and narrowed her Request for Documents and
Interrogatories—resolving the problem which lead to the July 6
Motion.

At the deposition, both parties agreed that Defendants

would provide Plaintiff with the needed information by July 15.
(Appendix C-8).
Mr. Padan spent many hours during the next days copying
documents from company computers and various floppy disks in an
effort to comply with Plaintiff's request (See Padan Affidavit, R.
160) .

However, two

(2) days before the documents were due,

Defendants' office was burglarized, and all the primary files as
well as the compiled copies to be turned over to Plaintiff were
stolen. Both Mr. Chambers and Mr. Padan left several messages with
9

Counsel for the Defendants was equally dissatisfied
with the
Plaintiff's
response to their discovery
(letter
dated ^OS'UJJ3>'J.> ^
) but had not yet sought
a Motion to Compel.
See Appendix C-3 «
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Plaintiffs counsel informing her of the burglary.
did not return any of the messages.

However, she

Instead, Plaintiff filed a

Notice to Submit for Decision, on Plaintifffs July 6 Motion to
Compel and for Sanctions.
On July 26, the trial court, without a hearing, granted
Plaintiff's Motion.

The court's only record of its judgment is

recorded in the Courts internal docket entry.

In the Comments

section of this docket entry, the language regarding the twenty
(20) day timetable appeared for the first time. The Defendants had
no notice of this language. The mailing certificate in the August
4 Order states that Defendants were mailed a copy of the proposed
Order on August 2, only two (2) days before Judge McCleve signed
the Order.
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration states:
Copies of all proposed findings judgments, and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders.
Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after
service.
The purpose of 4-504(2)

is to give opposing counsel an

opportunity to challenge a proposed order. However, having mailed
a proposed Order from Salt Lake City two (2) days before the Court
signs the Order denied Defendants of any practical opportunity to
object to the Order.

The Circuit Court did receive Defendants'

objection to the proposed order on August 8 (giving Defendants six
(6) days for the Order to come from

S.L.C. to Logan, have

Defendants draft a motion in opposition, and then mail that back to
S.L.C).

However, the objection was of no avail, the Order had

already been signed four (4) days earlier.
20

If Defendants had been given notice of the first Order
compelling discovery or if they had been given notice of a proposed
twenty (20) day limit, and given more than two (2) days to respond,
Defendants would have responded more forcefully and extensively.
In short, Plaintiff would have responded to the Motion in the same
manner and with the same evidence they offered in their Objection
to Order Granting Attorney's Fees and Motion for Relief from Order.
(See R. 150.)
In Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753 (1990), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the notice required for motions filed
pursuant to Rule 4-501(1), the very rule applicable to Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel and Judgment.

The Supreme Court in Cornish held:

Rule 4-501 assures timely notice of the nature of
proceedings against a party. In Nelson v. Jacobson,
we
stated, 'Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of
procedural fairness.' In Nelson we further noted: 'Many
cases have held that where notice is ambiguous or
inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the
proceeding against him or not given sufficiency in
advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party
is deprived of due process.'
Because Defendants were without notice of either the first
Order compelling discovery or the twenty (20) day timeframe, the
urgency and significance of Plaintiff's July 6 Motion was all but
absent.

However, if Defendants had been given proper notice of

either fact, then they would have opposed the Motion with the same
vigor and evidence they exhibited in their Objection to Order
Granting Attorney's Fees and Motion for Relief from Order.

The

difference would have been, that the Defendants would not have had
to overcome the presumptions in Rule 60(b).
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Defendants were twice denied proper notice by Plaintiff. Each
created a great prejudice against the Defendants1 case.

Thus,

Defendants pray for a vacating of the trial courtfs Judgment, which
was based solely on the twenty (20) day time limit, and remand to
the trial court for a trial on the merits of the case.
III. THE PLAINTIFFfS FAILURE TO TRANSMIT COPIES OF THE SIGNED ORDER
COMPELLING DISCOVERY AND JUDGMENT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
A. Standard of Review
This court in Hartford Leasing v. State of Utah, 255 Adv. Rep.
52 (1994) stated, "[a] trial courtfs interpretation of a rule in
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness."
The trial court dismissed Defendants1 Answer and entered
Judgment for the Plaintiff based on an Order compelling discovery
signed August 4, 1994.

Whether that Order complied with Rule 4-

504(4) is a question of law.

Thus, the standard of review is de

novo.
B.

Neither the Order Compelling Discovery nor the Judgment
were Transmitted to Defendants after Judge McCleve's
Signature.

Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
states:
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall
be served upon the opposing party, and proof of service
shall be filed with the court. All judgments . . . are
to be transmitted after signature of the judge,
(Emphasis added.)
The trial courtfs order:

granting Plaintifffs Motion to

Compel, requiring Defendants to comply with said order within
twenty (20) days, and awarding Plaintiff $200 in attorneys fees,
22

was signed and dated by Judge Sheila K. McCleve on August 4, 1994.
(R. 148.) However, the Orderfs Certificate of Service states that
a

true

and

correct

copy

of the above Order

was mailed

to

Defendants1 counsel on August 2, 1994; only two (2) days before
Judge McCleve signed the Order.
The Judgment, dismissing Defendants1

Answer and entering

Judgment for Plaintiff was signed August 24, 1994.

However, the

Mailing Certificate shows Defendants were mailed a copy on August
19—five (5) days before the judge signed the Judgment.
Defendants have never received a signed copy of either the
Order compelling discovery, the Judgment for Plaintiff, nor a
Notice of Entry of Judgment.

This case presents the problem Rule

4-504(4) was designed to prevent.
Again in Hartford, this court held, "[i]n interpreting a
statute or rule, we examine its fplain language and resort to other
methods

. . . only if the language is ambiguous." Id. at 55

(citations omitted).
The language of Rule 4-504(4) is clear. All judgments are to
be transmitted to opposing parties after being signed by the judge.
The trial courtfs August 4 Order was transmitted two (2) days
before it was signed by Judge McCleve. The record is absent of any
other evidence that either the August 4 Order or the August 24
Judgment were ever transmitted to the Defendants after Judge
McCleve signed them. The procedures of Rule 4-504(4), which ensure
due process, were not followed. Such a breach constitutes error by
the trial

court, requiring the Judgment

entered

Defendants vacated and the case remanded for trial.
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against

the

IV.

UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF CLAIM PRECLUSION AND ISSUE PRECLUSION,
THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN NOT BARRING PLAINTIFF FROM
RECOVERING "JUST OVER $11,000" OF THE $13,515.58 IN CLAIMED
DAMAGES UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF CLAIM PRECLUSION AND ISSUE
PRECLUSION.
A.

Standard of Review

Res Judicata is a question of law requiring a de novo standard
of review.
B.

The District Court Dismissed Mr. Bennettfs Claim Against
Defendants Pursuant to Section 58-55-17. now Section 5855-604 of the Utah Code, because Mr. Bennett was an
Unlicensed Contractor.

In order to establish the connection between the present case
and the case of Bennett v. James B. Craghead, F. Lynn Padan et.al
Civ. No. 940904047CV

it is necessary to briefly outline the

relevant facts.
Beginning in March of 1992, Mr. Mower was hired as a licensed
subcontractor to provide certain sheetrocking labor and supplies
for the remodeling of the Craghead home.
contracted with Mr. Bennett

In turn, Mr. Mower

(an unlicensed contractor) as an

independent contractor to provide much of actual sheetrocking labor
and supplies. The work was completed in August of 1992. Mr. Mower
and Mr. Bennett claimed their services totalled $31,874.53.

Mr.

Craghead and Mr. Padan background certain payments due Mr. Mower
and Or. Bennett claiming they damaged the interior of the home.
Mr. Mower and Mr. Bennett filed separate liens against the property
in the amount of $13,515.58 and $13,135.77.
Then, in 1993, both Mr. Mower and Mr. Bennett commenced
separate actions to foreclose on their respective mechanics liens.
Mr. Mower filed in Circuit Court and Mr. Bennett filed in District
Court.
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Discovery was commenced in both cases. As part of discovery,
Padan's counsel deposed Mr. Mower.

Mr. Mower stated at his

deposition that "just over $11,000.00" of his $13,515.58 claim was
due to Bennett's work, i.e., only $2,500 (approximate) is due him
separately as a markup for the materials.

(See Mower deposition in

District Court proceedings, page 26 lines 4-6.

Appendix B-5.)

Discovery in the Bennett case disclosed that Mr. Bennett was
not a licensed contractor, contrary to what Mr. Mower and Mr.
Bennett led Defendants to believe during construction. In response
to this information, Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of
Mr. Bennett's case pursuant to §58-55-17 U.C.A. (now §58-55-604),
which

prohibits

unlicensed

contractors

from

commencing

or

maintaining an action for collection of compensation for performing
any act for which a license was required.

The District Court

granted the motion and dismissed Mr. Bennett's mechanic's lien
claim for $13,135.77. (See Appendix A-l).
C.

Dismissal of the Bennett Case Precludes Plaintiff in the
Present Case from Recovering Just Over $11.000" of the
$13.515.58 in Claimed Damages under the Doctrines of
Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion.

Based on the District Court's dismissal of the Mower claim,
Plaintiff should have been precluded from recovery "just over
$11,000"

of

his

$13,515.58

claim

which,

by

Plaintiff's

own

admission, is due to work done by Mr. Bennett.
The Supreme Court of Utah defined issue preclusion and claim
preclusion in Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 P.2d 1059
(Utah 1988) . The court first discussed the two doctrines. It then
went on to define a "claim" and an "issue."

The court held "an

issue" may be described as a "certain and material point, affirmed
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by one party and denied by the other. • . No relief is inherent in
the resolution of an issue" Id, at 1061 (citations omitted).
The court then held

lf

a claim or cause of action11 is 'the

aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable
in the courts1. . . . A claim is the 'situation or state of facts
which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right
to seek judicial interference in his behalf.1" Id. (citations
omitted).
The dismissal of Mr. Bennettfs case could be defined as an
issue in the present case because, whether or not Mr. Mower can
recover $11,000.00 from the Defendants which was in fact owed to
Bennett

(when Bennett cannot maintain an action for that same

$11,000.00) is a material point at issue in the present case.
However, this same scenario could also be described as an aggregate
set of operative facts which give or deny the Plaintifffs claim to
"just

over

Complaint.

$11,000.00" of the $13,515.58 prayed

for

in his

Given this ambiguity, Defendants will apply the facts

to the elements of both issue and claim preclusion.
1.
The

Issue Preclusion

Swainston

court

set

forth

the

elements

of

issue

preclusion. They are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical
with the one presented in the action in question?
Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and
fairly litigated? Id^_ at 1061.

The issue in the Bennett case and the present case are
identical.

It is "Can the Defendants be held liable to pay for

work done by an unlicensed contractor?"
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In either the Bennett or Mower case, the fact remains, that at
all times, the Defendants would only hire licensed contractors and
at all times, Mower assured the Defendants that he was hiring only
licensed

subcontractors.

contractor—Bennett.

However, Mower hired an unlicensed

As a result, significant damage was done to

Mr. Craghead's home. This is the very harm §58-55-604 was designed
to prevent. The Defendants1 liability for work done by Bennett was
the sole question in the Bennett case.

And as for $11,000.00 of

Mowers $13,515.58 claim, it is the sole question in this case.
This issue was already decided in Bennett v. Cracrhead, et al. The
first element is clearly established.
The District Court's dismissal of the Bennett case was final.
Rule 41(b) of Utah R. of Civ. Proc. states:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue
or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
The District Court dismissed the Bennett claim based on §5855-17, now §58-55-604. That dismissal was final and based upon the
merits.

The second element is clearly established.

Mr. Bennett and Mr. Mower were also in privity with one
another in regards to their claims against Defendants. Each claim
arises out of one separate construction agreement between Mr. Mower
and the Defendants. There was no agreement between the Defendants
and

Bennett.

Of

Mowerfs

$13,515.58

$11,000.00 is due to Bennettfs work.

claim,

he

admits

over

All parties in this action

(Circuit Court) were also parties in the District Court action.
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In either the Bennett or Mower case, the fact remains, that at
all times, the Defendants would only hire licensed contractors and
at all times, Mower assured the Defendants that he was hiring only
licensed

subcontractors.

contractor—Bennett.

However, Mower hired an unlicensed

As a result, significant damage was done to

Mr. Cragheadfs home. This is the very harm §58-55-604 was designed
to prevent. The Defendants1 liability for work done by Bennett was
the sole question in the Bennett case.

And as for $11,000.00 of

Mowers $13,515.58 claim, it is the sole question in this case.
This issue was already decided in Bennett v. Cracrhead, et al. The
first element is clearly established.
The District Court's dismissal of the Bennett case was final.
Rule 41(b) of Utah R. of Civ. Proc. states:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue
or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
The District Court dismissed the Bennett claim based on §5855-17, now §58-55-604. That dismissal was final and based upon the
merits.

The second element is clearly established.

Mr. Bennett and Mr. Mower were also in privity with one
another in regards to their claims against Defendants. Each claim
arises out of one separate construction agreement between Mr. Mower
and the Defendants. There was no agreement between the Defendants
and

Bennett.

Of

Mowerfs

$13,515.58

$11,000.00 is due to Bennett's work.

claim,

he

admits

over

All parties in this action

(Circuit Court) were also parties in the District Court action.
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The elements having been met, Mower is precluded from claiming
the

$11,000.00

due

to work

done

by

Bennett, an

unlicensed

contractor.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above the Defendants respectfully
requests this court order the Circuit Court to vacate the Default
Judgment and reinstate Defendants1 Answer and Counterclaim and
enter an order that under the circumstances the Defendants did not
willfully fail to answer the discovery and that barred thereon the
matter should proceed to trial.
Respectfully"
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